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6 The Role of Trade and Exchange 
Rate Policy in Korea’s Growth 
Chong-Hyun Nam 
6.1 Introduction 
Since the 1960s the Korean economy’s rapid growth has attracted attention 
worldwide. Although Korea’s success may be linked to a number of factors, an 
outward-oriented trade strategy adopted in the early 1960s and onward has 
often been cited as the most important contributor. 
The evolution of economic policies in Korea, however, suggests that the 
outward-oriented strategy was not instituted by a single stroke of policy, but 
rather was implemented through a very complicated and continuing process 
under heavy-handed government intervention. For example, until very recently 
domestic markets remained highly protected for a supposedly outward- 
oriented economy, and during the 1970s, the government was actively involved 
in promoting the so-called heavy and chemical industries (HCIs),’ with pack- 
age assistance programs for these “strategic” industries. For these reasons, 
many-both inside and outside Korea-have questioned whether Korea’s suc- 
cess was possible because of, or in spite of, a very activist role for government 
in both trade and investment activities throughout most of its recent eco- 
nomic development. 
The purpose of this paper is to review the evolution of Korea’s trade and 
exchange rate policy and to examine the role it has played in Korea’s economic 
growth over the 1962-91 period. Following this analysis, I will highlight sev- 
eral lessons that developing countries can learn from Korea’s experiences. 
Chong-Hyun Nam is professor of economics at Korea University. 
The author is grateful to Anne 0. Krueger, Sebastian Edwards, and Shang-Jin Wei for valuable 
1 .  HCIs include such industries as basic metals, petrochemicals, machinery, electrical and elec- 
comments, and to Hong-Sik Lee for research assistance. 
tronic products, and transport equipment. 
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6.2 Evolution of Trade and Exchange Rate Policies and 
Growth Performance, 1962-91 
6.2.1 Establishing an Outward-oriented Economy through 
Export Promotion 
Prior to 1960, the Korean economy suffered from severe macroeconomic 
imbalances, such as high unemployment, budget deficits, and balance-of- 
payments deficits under the high pressure of inflation, all of which could be 
expected in an immediate postwar period. During the latter half of the 1950s, 
for example, annual inflation averaged more than 30 percent and the balance- 
of-payments deficit averaged between 5 and 10 percent of GNP. 
The government’s efforts were therefore largely directed to alleviating eco- 
nomic pressures on the price level and the balance of payments. As part of the 
anti-inflationary measures, nominal exchange rates were kept fixed with only 
insufficient adjustments, resulting in the chronic overvaluation of the Korean 
won. On the other hand, to bring the balance-of-payments problem under con- 
trol, the authorities resorted heavily to import restriction measures such as mul- 
tiple exchange rates, import licensing, and high tariffs on selected items. To be 
sure, there were some export incentives introduced during the 1950s, includ- 
ing, for example, financing for the purchase of export goods, an export bonus 
given through preferential foreign exchanges, and discounts on railroad freight 
(Hong 1979,53-57). The net result of these policies, however, was discrimina- 
tion against exports, since incentives given for import substitution were far 
greater. Thus, until the late 1950s, Korea was a typical inward-oriented 
economy. 
In contrast to the imbalanced economic policies during the 1950s, numerous 
policy reforms and new plans were put forth during the 1960s, beginning with 
the first Five-Year Economic Plan (1962-66) implemented in 1962. Issues 
such as development of key industries and creation of an adequate supply of 
social overhead capital were especially stressed in this plan, as well as in the 
succeeding Five-Year Economic Plans. 
The major policy shift, however, began with the reform of the payment re- 
gime and of the financial sector in 1964 and 1965. After a unified exchange 
rate was established in 1961, the Korean currency was devalued from 130 won 
to 255 won per U.S. dollar in May 1964. Following the exchange rate reform, 
the government raised the interest rates on ordinary loans of banking institu- 
tions from 16 to 26 percent per annum in September 1965. Along with these 
reforms, the government introduced a comprehensive set of export incentives 
during the 1960s. 
The export incentives included a preferential tax system, a preferential loan 
system, and various administrative support systems. The preferential tax sys- 
tem consisted of tariff exemptions on imported raw materials and intermediate 
and capital goods for export production, exemptions from indirect taxes for 
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intermediate inputs and export sales, the reduction of direct taxes on profits 
earned through export activities, the introduction of reserve funds created from 
taxable income to develop new foreign markets and to defray export losses, 
and the creation of an accelerated depreciation allowance for fixed capital used 
directly in export production. The preferential loan system provided exporters 
with access to subsidized short- and long-term credits for their purchase 
of inputs and financing of fixed investments. Also, generous wastage allow- 
ances were granted on imported duty-free raw materials over and above the 
requirements of actual export production. An export-import linkage system 
permitting access to otherwise prohibited imports was put into operation, and 
preferential rates on several overhead inputs such as electricity were made 
available. 
Some of these export incentives simply enabled exporters to operate under 
a virtually free trade regime by allowing them to buy their inputs and sell their 
outputs at world market prices. But others constituted genuine subsidies that 
helped to enhance the profitability of export sales relative to domestic sales. In 
fact, given that the effective protection rates for domestic sales were estimated 
at - 1.1 percent for the manufacturing sector and 17.8 percent for the agricul- 
tural sector in 1968, the Korean incentive system appears to have favored man- 
ufacturing production activities for export sales over domestic sales during 
the 1960s.* 
The system of export incentives remained virtually unchanged through the 
early 1970s. Beginning in 1973, however, some of these incentives were abol- 
ished in order to reduce the scope of export subsidies. The 50 percent reduction 
in taxes on profits from export earnings was abolished in 1973. In July 1975, 
the system of prior tariff exemptions on imported inputs used in export produc- 
tion was changed into a drawback system. The discount on electricity was abol- 
ished in 1976, and wastage allowances were repeatedly reduced, bringing them 
closer to the actual rate during the 1970s. 
As a result, since the mid-l970s, interest rate subsidies and the availability 
of export-related loans have become the major export incentives. Preferential 
loans for export activities were steadily expanded throughout the 1970s. For 
instance, preferential short- and long-term loans to export industries as a pro- 
portion of total domestic credit increased from 5.1 percent in 1966 to 20.5 
percent in 1978 (Nam 1981b, 193). The average interest rate on all preferential 
export loans was 7.7 percent in 1966 and 10.6 percent in 1978, whereas the 
lending rate on ordinary loans from commercial banks was 26.4 percent in 
1966 and 19.0 percent in 1978. This interest rate differential between preferen- 
tial and ordinary loans was gradually reduced and finally abolished with the 
June 1982 interest rate reform. Simultaneously, the government restricted the 
availability of export-related loans, so that by 1988, only small firms could 
2. See Westphal and Kim (1977, table 2). and further discussion follows in the next section. 
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Table 6.1 Tariff and Nontariff Import Restrictions in Korea, 1957-91 
Number of 
Automatic 
Simple Average Number of Approval Total Number Rate of Import 
Tariff Rates Prohibited or Items of Import Items Liberalization 
Year (%I Restricted Items (A) (B) ( A m % )  
1957 
1962 
1967 
1973 
1975 
1977 
1979 
1981 
1983 
1985 
1987 
1989 
1991 
30.3 
39.9 
39.9 
31.5 
31.5 
29.7 
24.8 
24.9 
23.7 
21.3 
19.3 
12.7 
11.4 
520 
629 
668 
62 1 
928 
1,911 
1,482 
970 
499 
465 
283 
792 
683 
664 
664 
682 
5,649 
6,078 
6,945 
7,408 
9,776 
9,991 
1,312 
1,312 
1,312 
1,312 
1,010 
7,560 
7,560 
7,915 
7,911 
10,241 
10,274 
60.4 
52.1 
49.1 
52.7 
67.5 
74.7 
80.4 
87.7 
93.6 
95.5 
97.2 
Sources: Korean Traders Association, Annual Report on Foreign Trade (Seoul, various years); Kim 
(1988, tables 3 and 4) for 1957 and 1962. 
Nore; The classification of import items was based on the SITC basic codes through 1977, four- 
digit CCCN codes for 1979, eight-digit CCCN codes during 1981-87, and 10-digit HS codes 
during 1989-91. 
receive them. This action reduced their share in total domestic credit to less 
than 3 percent by 1991. 
6.2.2 Import Restrictions and Liberalization in an Outward-oriented 
Economy 
Despite the introduction of a comprehensive set of export promotion policies 
in the early 1960s, the relaxation of import controls did not proceed in any 
significant way until the latter half of the 1960s. In fact, faced with dwindling 
U.S. foreign assistance and widening trade deficits, the military government 
that came into power in 1961 tightened import controls in the early 1960s. As 
a result, the simple average of legal tariff rates reached a peak of nearly 40 
percent in 1962 and stayed at that level throughout the 1960s (see table 6.1). 
In addition to the regular tariffs, special tariffs were also used between 1964 
and 1973. The special tariffs were introduced mainly to soak up some of the 
excess profits that might accrue to importers of inessential commodities that 
were subject to quantitative restrictions (QRs). The special tariff rates were 
estimated at 0.8-3.2 percent of the total value of imports during the 1964-72 
period (Kim 1988, 15) before they were abolished in 1973. The average legal 
tariff rate gradually fell thereafter, reaching 11.4 percent by 199 1. 
Although the legal tariff rates were generally set very high, they were to a 
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Table 6.2 Operative Import Tariff Rates in Korea, 196691 
1966 1970 1975 1980 1985 1991 
A. Tariffs collected and exempted 
1. Tariff collected (billion won) 
2. Tariff exempted (billion won) 
3. Total legal tariffs (A.l + A.2) 
4. Total imports (million U.S. $) 
5. Total imports (billion won) 
1. Actual tariff rates (A. UA.5) 
2. Legal tariff rates (A.3/A.5) 
B. Tariff rates 
18.0 50.9 181.0 766.1 1,566.1 3,435.5 
20.3 107.1 222.7 789.5 2,982.0 3,711.0 
38.3 158.0 403.7 1,555.6 4,548.1 7,146.5 
716.4 1,194.0 7,274.4 21,598.0 31,135.6 81.524.9 
194.4 616.2 3,520.8 13,737.0 27,716.3 62,024.1 
9.3 8.3 5.1 5.6 5.6 5.5 
19.7 25.6 11.5 11.3 16.4 11.5 
Sources: Ministry of Finance, Office of Taxation; Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook 
(Seoul, 1992). 
large extent inoperative in Korea. Many imports were exempt from duties, and 
a number of commodities were subject to prohibitive tariffs. Intermediate 
goods for export production, for instance, were imported duty free, as were 
some capital goods for special uses or specific industries. Table 6.2 presents 
the data on tariffs actually collected and exempted, with the implicit tariff rates 
calculated on the basis-of these data. According to the data, the legal tariff 
rates for all commodity imports far exceeded the actual tariff rates over the 
1966-91 p e r i ~ d . ~  During the latter half of 1960s, the legal tariff rate reached 
20-26 percent, whereas the actual tariff rate remained at around 8-9 percent. 
In the 1970s and 1980s, the legal tariff rate fell to 11-16 percent and the actual 
tariff rate reached around 5-6 percent. These figures for legal and actual tariff 
rates, however, should not be taken as a measure of protection given to import 
substitution activities in Korea because, at least until recently, the QRs applied 
to many import items have been far more important than tariffs in controlling 
imports. 
Indeed, as of the mid- 1960s, imports were tightly controlled by the extensive 
use of QRs in Korea. According to Kim’s estimation (1988, 20), as much as 
88 percent of all import items were subject to QRs in the first half of 1967, 
despite the fact that import items liberalized under the “positive list” system 
increased from 1,447 to 2,950 during the 1965-67 period. A significant import 
liberalization, however, took place in the second half of 1967, as the earlier 
positive list system was replaced by a negative list system, in which all import 
items not listed were automatically approved for importation. As can be seen 
in the last column of table 6.1, more than 60 percent of the 1,312 basic import 
items (SITC four-digit) became automatically approved for import in 1967. 
But since then, the import liberalization rate fell steadily until 1975, when it 
reached a low of 49.1 percent. 
3. Both legal and actual tariff rates calculated here represent an average rate weighted by import 
shares of individual import items. 
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This setback in liberalization was partly a result of the government’s effort 
at that time to promote the HCIs. The government began the HCI drive by 
introducing a series of industry-specific promotional laws in the late 1960s, 
but it pursued the policy much more vigorously during the 1973-79 period 
when it instituted package assistance programs for in~estment.~ 
The government began to relax import controls in 1977, as the current ac- 
count balance developed a small surplus, mainly due to increased income from 
oversea construction businesses in the oil-rich Middle Eastern countries. This 
liberalization was also interrupted by the second oil shock of 1979 and the 
worsening of the balance-of-payments situation in subsequent years. At the 
same time, large investment projects in the HCIs encouraged by the govern- 
ment in the 1970s began to produce a number of failures by the late 1970s. 
Consequently, the Korean economy underwent a period of serious stagna- 
tion in both growth and export performance during 1979-81, registering a neg- 
ative real growth rate, of 3.7 percent in 1980, for the first time in its postwar 
history. At the same time, the Korean economy was suffering from a number 
of structural imbalances, such as underdevelopment of the financial sector, in- 
sufficient development of small and medium-sized firms, and an unjustifiable 
protection structure of the home markets. 
The policy reaction of the government to these unfavorable developments 
was to increase its reliance on market mechanisms. First, a long overdue cur- 
rency adjustment was made. The Korean won, which had been pegged to the 
U.S. dollar at 484 won per dollar since 1974, was devalued to 580 won per 
dollar in 1980. After that, the Korean won was allowed to depreciate gradually 
to 893 won per dollar by the end of 1985. 
The government also stepped up its effort to liberalize import controls and 
thereby to increase competition in domestic markets and to reduce the cost of 
protection. In 1983, the government announced a time-phased import liberal- 
ization plan for the 1983-88 period. According to the plan, not only was the 
range of basic tariff rates to be reduced, but the average basic tariff rate was to 
be lowered from 23.7 percent in 1983 to 18.1 percent by 1988. At the same 
time, Korea’s import liberalization rate was to be increased from 80.3 percent 
in 1983 to 95.2 percent by 1988. It is notable that this liberalization plan was 
put into action when the Korean economy was suffering from persistent trade 
deficits. 
After the successful and timely completion of the 1983 liberalization, a new 
tariff reform plan was prepared for 1989-93. According to this new plan, the 
average tariff rate was to be decreased from 18.1 percent in 1988 to 7.9 percent 
4. There were several reasons for launching the HCI drive in the early 1970s. First, the govern- 
ment feared that Korea would soon lose its international competitiveness in labor-intensive manu- 
factured goods, largely due to the rapid increase in domestic wage-rental ratios at the time. Second, 
rising protectionism abroad against imports of light industrial products was also viewed as a limit 
to continued export expansion. Finally, national security concerns worked for the promotion of the 
HCIs as a way of building a strong defense industry. 
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in 1993, and the average tariff rate for manufactures from 16.9 percent to 6.2 
percent in the same period. 
Along with the import liberalization schemes, the government introduced a 
series of policy reforms in the 1930s. Among other measures, the major com- 
mercial banks were privatized, and all interest subsidies were eliminated from 
“policy” loans, including export loans, in 1982. All industry-specific promo- 
tion laws were abolished, and a more general Industry Promotion Law was 
introduced in 1986. The government also resorted to tighter monetary and fis- 
cal restraints. These policy reforms undoubtedly contributed to the success of 
the Korean economy in curbing inflation, resuming a high growth rate, and 
turning the trade balance from red to black in the latter half of the 1980s. 
6.2.3 Long-Term Economic Performance 
Table 6.3 provides basic data on the growth and transformation of the Ko- 
rean economy for the 1962-9 1 period. Real GNP of Korea has increased more 
than 18-fold during the 1962-91 period, with an average annual growth rate of 
10.6 percent. This contrasts with an average growth rate of 3.6 percent during 
the earlier inward-oriented period of 1954-62. As a result, real per capita GNP 
in Korea rose from $306 in 1962 to $5,240 in 1991 when measured in 1985 
U.S. constant prices. The gradual decline in the rate of population growth, 
from 2.6 percent for 1962-7 1 to 1.1 percent for 198 1-9 1, also contributed to 
this rapid increase in per capita income (Korea’s population grew to 43.3 mil- 
lion by 1991, from 25.6 million in 1962). 
The policy shift in the early 1960s brought fundamental changes in all sec- 
tors of the economy. First of all, rapid expansion of exports was achieved, 
initially through the rapid increase of labor-intensive production, followed by 
the expansion of capital- and skill-intensive production as factor endowments 
shifted with capital and skill accumulation. As seen in table 6.3, the ratio of 
exports to GNP was only 2.4 percent ($54 million) as of 1962, but rose to 11.6 
percent ($1.1 billion) in 1971, and to 25.6 percent ($71.9 billion) in 1991. 
Moreover, manufactured goods have been the dominant element in export 
growth: exports of manufactured goods accounted for only 27.0 percent of 
total exports in 1962, but increased their share to 86.0 percent by 1971, and to 
95.4 percent by 1991. As a result, the share of the manufacturing sector in 
GNP rose from 11.7 percent in 1962 to 27.5 percent in 1991, whereas agricul- 
ture’s share decreased from 43.6 percent to 8.1 percent in the same period. 
Likewise, the share of the manufacturing sector in total employment increased 
from 8.7 percent in 1962 to 26.9 percent in 1991, whereas agriculture’s share 
declined from 63.1 percent to 16.7 percent in the same period. 
The rapid expansion of labor-intensive production since the early 1960s has 
also helped to improve the employment situation: the official unemployment 
rate, which stood at 8.4 percent in 1962, decreased to 4.4 percent in 1971, and 
to 2.3 percent in 1991. The labor market has remained at near full employment 
since 1973, with an unemployment rate never more than 4 percent, except dur- 
Table 6.3 Major Economic Indicators for Korea, 1962-91 
Indicator 
Average Annual Growth Rate 
1962 1971 1981 1991 
1962-71 1971-81 1981-91 1962-91 
Population (million) 
GNP (billion won). 
Per capita GNP 
In thousand won" 
In US. dollarsb 
Sectoral share in GNP (%) 
Agriculture 
Manufacturing 
Services and social overhead 
Sectoral share in employment (%) 
Agriculture 
Manufacturing 
Services and social overhead 
26.5 32.9 
7,595 18,564 
287 564 
306 735 
43.6 29.5 
11.7 21.8 
44.7 48.7 
63.1 48.2 
8.7 14.2 
28.2 37.6 
38.7 
55,354 
1,430 
2.074 
15.6 
31.3 
53.1 
34.2 
21.3 
44.5 
43.3 2.4 1.6 1.1 1.7 
14 1,602 10.4 11.5 9.8 10.6 
3,270 8.0 9.9 8.7 8.9 
5.240 
8.1 
27.5 
64.4 
16.7 
26.9 
56.4 
Unemployment rate (%) 
Exports and impom 
Commodity exportsc (f.0.b.; million US. $) 
Ratio of exports to GNP (%) 
Share of manufactures in exports (%) 
Commodity imports' ( c i f . ;  million U.S. $) 
Ratio of imports to GNP (%) 
Investment and saving 
Share of investment in GNP (%) 
Domestic saving rate (%) 
Foreign saving rate (%) 
GNP deflator (1985=100) 
Wholesale price index (1985=100) 
Real wage indexd ( I  985= 100)  
8.4 
54 
2.4 
27.0 
42 1 
183 
12.8 
3.3 
10.6 
3.3 
5.6 
21.8 
4.4 
1,067 
11.6 
86.0 
2,394 
25.2 
25.4 
15.5 
10.8 
12.8 
15.8 
36.8 
4.5 2.3 
21,254 
31.9 
92.9 
26,131 
29.1 
29.1 
21.7 
7.8 
82.2 
93.9 
75.9 
7 1,870 39.3 34.8 12.9 28.2 
25.6 
95.4 
29.0 
81,525 21.3 27.0 12.1 19.9 
39.4 
36.2 
3.1 
145.5 16.3 20.4 5.9 13.9 
111.3 12.2 19.5 1.9 10.9 
180.3 6.0 7.5 9.0 7.6 
- 
Source: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook (Seoul, various years). 
*Based on 1985 constant prices. 
bBased on 1985 U.S. constant prices. 
'Based on current prices. 
dFor the manufacturing sector. 
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ing the period of economic stagnation in the early 1980s. In the late 1980s, a 
labor shortage was acutely felt in some sectors of the economy, due to an over- 
heated domestic construction boom. 
During the past 30 years, foreign financing has played an important role in 
filling the domestic investment and savings gap, to allow for Korea’s rapid 
growth. Table 6.3 indicates that gross investment rose from 12.8 percent of 
GNP in 1962 to near 40 percent by 1991. The domestic saving rate, however, 
measured only 3.3 percent of GNP in 1962, but rose rapidly with growth in 
real incomes, reaching 36.2 percent by 1991. As a result, foreign financing in 
terms of the ratio to GNP fell from nearly 10 percent in 1962 to 3.1 percent by 
1991. In the meantime, however, Korea briefly became a net capital exporter 
due to a rising surplus in its trade account: between 1986 and 1989 Korea 
experienced a period of trade surplus, reaching a peak of 8.1 percent of GNP 
in 1988. 
Despite the impressive performance of the Korean economy over the 1962- 
91 period, a few aspects of the underlying policy management need to be men- 
tioned. First, the HCI promotion drive of 1973-79 scarred the Korean economy 
for years. It created excess capacities in some unprofitable industries, while 
depleting investment funds that would have otherwise been available to other 
export industrie~.~ Distortions in the domestic capital market were also severe 
since preferential loans below market rates became a major instrument in pro- 
moting the HCIs. 
Second, despite the high domestic inflation rate relative to that of Korea’s 
trading partners during the 1970s, the exchange rate had been pegged at 484 
won per U.S. dollar during 1974-80, resulting in a real appreciation of the won 
against the dollar by more than 20 percent for 1973-79 (see table 6.4 in the 
next section). Thus, the massive investments in the HCIs, combined with the 
stagnation in export performance due to unfavorable exchange rates, forced the 
Korean economy to rely heavily on foreign borrowing to finance its domestic 
savings gap, raising the external debt, which stood at $16.8 billion in 1978, to 
$40.1 billion by 1983. 
Third, ever since the first Five-Year Economic Plan was launched in 1962, 
the government had tended to put forward very ambitious investment pro- 
grams, which were often met by a rapid increase in monetary growth. This in 
turn helped raise domestic price levels, especially for the first two decades of 
the 1962-91 period: the average annual inflation rate in terms of GNP deflators 
was 16.3 percent for 1962-71 and 20.4 percent for 1971-81, but it fell to 5.9 
5. The absorption of fixed investment by the HCIs continued to rise from 49 percent of all fixed 
investment in the manufacturing sector in 1973 to nearly 70 percent in 1979. In the meantime, the 
capacity utilization rate for certain HCIs fell well below the average rate for the manufacturing 
sector, resulting in poor business performance. For instance, the average capacity utilization rate 
averaged only 35 percent for transport equipment, 60 percent for machinery, and 69 percent for 
electrical appliances in 1979, whereas it was estimated at 82 percent for the manufacturing sector 
as a whole in the same year. See Nam (1981% 174, 193). 
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percent for 198 1-9 1. Of course, such inflation rates could be regarded as mod- 
est compared to those experienced by some Latin American countries, but they 
were much higher than those experienced by Korea’s immediate competitors 
Taiwan, Singapore, and Japan. 
Finally, throughout most of the recent development period of 1962-91, the 
Korean labor market has remained rather undistorted. No minimum wage law 
was enforced, nor was any disruptive action by labor unions allowed. But with 
the recent democratization drive launched by the government in 1987, Korea 
has witnessed rapid growth in union membership and in the number of violent 
labor disputes.6 Unions exerted tremendous pressure for a steep wage hike in 
the late 1980s, in an economy which was already strained by a labor shortage. 
Moreover, as Korea’s trade balance (especially with the United States) turned 
into a surplus beginning in 1986, the Korean government was hard pressed by 
the U.S. authorities to alter the won-dollar exchange rate and to reduce Korea’s 
trade surplus with the United States. This led to a rapid, and perhaps too large, 
appreciation of the won from 881 won per dollar in 1986 to 671 won per dollar 
in 1989. By 1990, Korea’s trade account was again running a deficit and ex- 
ports stopped growing in real terms. By 1992, the growth rate of real GNP fell 
to less than 5 percent, the lowest rate since 1980. Undoubtedly, a sharp rise 
both in real wages and in won values in the late 1980s played an important role 
in bringing about this outcome, though the extent to which they contributed to 
is not known. 
6.3 The Relation between Trade Incentives, Exchange Rates, and 
Economic Growth 
The single most important feature of Korea’s rapid economic growth over 
the past three decades is that it has been accompanied by even faster growth 
of manufactured exports. The rapid growth of exports must have served as 
an important source of employment creation by stimulating domestic produc- 
tion in a multiplied way when the domestic economy was subject to high un- 
employment, as was the situation in the 1960s and the early 1970s in Korea. 
The Korean economy must also have benefited from a number of dynamic 
externalities generated by opening domestic markets to foreign competition, 
not to mention the static gains from trade expansion itself. As shown in the 
previous section, a number of policies have been actively pursued by the Ko- 
rean government in order to make this export-led growth possible. The relative 
importance of those policies in explaining export growth and their possible 
links to economic growth will be examined below. 
6. The number of labor disputes increased from 276 cases in 1986 to 3,749 cases in 1987. The 
number has been decreasing since then, to 1,616 cases in 1989 and 234 cases by 1991. See Sakong 
(1993, 83). 
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6.3.1 
Table 6.4 provides summary statistics on the impact of major trade incen- 
tives in terms of effective exchange rates for exports and imports. The effective 
exchange rate for exports includes the subsidy effects of the following: the 
dollar premium due to multiple exchange rates (1963-64 only), direct subsidy 
payments (1962-64 only), direct tax reduction (1962-73 only), and interest 
subsidies due to preferential rates (1962-82 only). The relative importance of 
these export subsidies was particularly pronounced in the early 1960s when 
the nominal exchange rate was kept unrealistically low. For instance, the effec- 
tive export subsidies amounted to as much as 36.6 percent of the official ex- 
change rate in 1963 and 23.1 percent in 1964, but since then, they were never 
greater than 6.7 percent (in 1971), and in 1982 they were entirely removed. 
The effective export subsidies measured above, however, underestimate the 
true level for several reasons. First, they do not include subsidy effects such as 
those from accelerated depreciation allowances, reserve funds for developing 
export markets and export losses, wastage allowances, and preferential rates 
on some overhead inputs, because either these factors are relatively insignifi- 
cant in magnitude or the data are not available. Second, the interest subsidy 
above has been estimated by taking the differential between the interest paid 
by exporters under preferential rates and the interest payable at nonpreferential 
rates. The nonpreferential lending rates on ordinary bank loans, however, were 
also under complete government control and often were set unrealistically low.’ 
Finally, although it is impossible to quantify the value, no one can deny that 
the effect of the informal incentives-such as the rapid processing of govern- 
ment paper work, the assurance of governmental support in the future, etc.- 
that the government provided to exporters may have been substantial. 
More important than the role of effective export subsidies, however, has 
been the role of exchange rate management itself in keeping Korean exporters 
competitive in international markets. Given the fact that the Korean inflation 
rate was much higher than that of its major trading partners, the lack of flexi- 
bility in exchange rate management could have grossly undermined Korean 
exporters’ international competitiveness. To show how the exchange rate was 
managed for the 1962-91 period, table 6.4 provides estimates of various real 
exchange rates which were obtained by adjusting nominal rates for changes in 
purchasing power parity (see notes to table 6.4). Several features of the table 
are noteworthy. First, continuous adjustments in nominal exchange rates, not 
the extent of export subsidies, played the dominant role in keeping real ex- 
change rates stable and hence maintaining exporters’ international competi- 
tiveness. For instance, between 1962 and 1982, during which period export 
subsidies were provided, export subsidies never accounted for more than 7 
percent of nominal exchange rates except for a few years in the early 1960s, 
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7. In fact, Hong’s (1979) estimate has shown that all loans through financial institutions in the 
1970s were extended, on average, at a negative real rate of interest. 
Table 6.4 Nominal and Real Effective Exchange Rates for Exports and Imports, 
1962-91 
Nominal Exchange Rate" Wholesale Price Index Real Exchange Rated 
(won per U.S. $) (1985= 100) (won per U.S. $) 
Export-Import 
Major Trading Official Effective Rate Exchange 
Year Rate Exports Imports Korea Partners' Rate Exports Imports RateRatio 
1962 130.0 141.8 146.3 5.6 30.1 697.0 762.3 786.5 0.99 
Official Effective Rateb 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
130.0 
213.8 
266.4 
270.3 
268.3 
276.3 
288.4 
310.4 
350.1 
394.0 
398.5 
406.0 
484.0 
484.0 
484.0 
484.0 
484.0 
607.4 
68 1 .O 
73 1 .O 
775.7 
805.9 
870.0 
881.4 
822.5 
73 1.4 
67 1.4 
707.7 
733.3 
177.6 148.1 6.7 
263.1 246.4 9.1 
276.3 294.2 10.0 
276.7 295.4 10.9 
281.3 293.8 11.5 
293.3 302.2 12.5 
306.4 312.9 13.3 
330.6 336.1 14.5 
374.1 371.9 15.8 
408.6 417.9 19.3 
408.5 417.9 19.3 
413.2 424.5 27.4 
494.1 508.9 34.6 
496.3 515.4 38.8 
493.4 519.7 42.3 
495.0 526.9 47.3 
495.0 522.3 56.1 
628.0 642.9 78.0 
696.0 717.6 93.9 
734.0 774.1 98.2 
775.7 734.4 98.4 
805.9 857.9 99.1 
870.0 920.3 100.0 
881.4 942.9 98.5 
882.5 888.2 99.0 
731.4 781.1 101.7 
671.4 705.8 103.2 
707.7 747.3 107.5 
773.3 775.4 113.3 
30.2 
30.8 
30.9 
31.8 
31.6 
32.8 
33.6 
34.3 
35.7 
43.1 
43.1 
55.8 
61.2 
62.3 
74.6 
77.1 
84.6 
96.3 
101.0 
98.7 
99.0 
100.2 
100.0 
101.8 
109.5 
122.4 
126.7 
130.6 
134.7 
586.1 800.0 667.1 
725.0 891.8 835.3 
821.3 852.7 908.0 
789.3 809.1 863.7 
731.1 766.5 800.5 
725.8 769.8 793.2 
730.6 773.2 792.2 
729.4 776.3 788.9 
790.3 844.5 839.5 
889.3 912.0 932.8 
889.3 912.0 932.8 
82.73 841.5 864.6 
856.9 841.5 864.6 
776.4 796.6 827.3 
853.2 870.2 916.6 
791.1 808.8 860.9 
730.2 746.6 787.8 
750.8 776.3 794.7 
734.0 750.0 773.3 
734.6 737.7 778.0 
780.3 780.3 839.4 
814.8 814.8 867.4 
870.0 870.0 920.3 
910.1 910.1 974.0 
910.0 910.0 982.5 
880.1 880.1 939.9 
825.3 825.3 867.1 
860.1 860.1 908.0 
875.5 875.5 921.9 
1.20 
1.07 
0.94 
0.94 
0.96 
0.97 
0.98 
0.98 
1.01 
0.98 
0.98 
0.97 
0.97 
0.96 
0.95 
0.94 
0.95 
0.98 
0.97 
0.95 
0.93 
0.94 
0.95 
0.94 
0.93 
0.94 
0.95 
0.95 
0.95 
Sources: Bank of Korea, Economic Sfutistics Yearbook (Seoul, various years); International Monetary 
Fund, International Finuncial Statistics (Washington, D.C., various years). 
"Data for 1962-65 were obtained from Westphal and Kim (1982, 218), and others were calculated by 
the author. 
The  effective exchange rate for exports includes exchange premiums due to multiple exchange rates, 
direct cash subsidies, direct tax reductions, and interest subsidies per dollar of exports, but excludes indi- 
rect tax and tariff exemptions. The effective exchange rate for imports includes actual tariffs collected per 
dollar of imports, but excludes the price effects of QRs on imports. 
'Major trading partners include the United States, Japan, West Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. 
The wholesale price index was calculated by a geometric average of those of these five nations using their 
trade volumes with Korea as weights. 
d1985 is taken as the base year. 
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while the nominal exchange rate itself changed from 130 won per U.S. dollar 
in 1962 to 731 won per U.S. dollar in 1982, almost 600 percent! 
Second, adjustments in nominal exchange rates, however, have not always 
been successful in maintaining stable real exchange rates over time. For in- 
stance, until 1973, in the early period of outward orientation, nominal ex- 
change rates had been depreciating fast enough to more than offset inflation 
differentials between home and abroad, raising the real effective exchange for 
exports from 762.3 won per U.S. dollar in 1962 to 912.0 won per U.S. dollar 
in 1973. In 1974, however, the nominal exchange rate was pegged at 484 won 
per U.S. dollar and remained unchanged through 1979, mainly to dampen do- 
mestic inflationary pressure built up by the first oil shock as well as by the 
excessive investment drive in the HCIs. As a result, the real effective exchange 
rate for exports again fell back to 746.6 won per U.S. dollar by 1979, and it 
fell further to a low of 737.7 won per U.S. dollar by 1982 in the wake of the 
second oil shock. However, it gradually rose to 910.0 won per U.S. dollar by 
1986, mainly due to the continuous depreciation of the nominal exchange rate 
and the slowdown in domestic inflation rates. 
Finally, table 6.4 presents estimates of effective exchange rates for imports, 
which were obtained by adding actual tariffs collected per dollar of imports to 
the official exchange rates. These estimates, however, do not include the price 
effects of QRs applied on imports and hence underestimate the nominal pro- 
tection given to import substitution, especially during the 1960s and 1970s, 
when the use of QRs was most pronounced. Given this deficiency, the last 
column of table 6.4 provides the export-import effective exchange rate ratio. 
As can be seen, it turns out to be very close to one in most years, except for 
1963. This suggests that trade incentives as a whole have acted together so as 
to roughly maintain neutrality between exports and import substitution in Ko- 
rea. Since 1982, however, import substitution has been slightly favored over 
exportation-export incentives had been almost completely removed by then. 
In order to show the importance of real effective exchange rates in determin- 
ing exporters’ international competitiveness, the movement of real effective 
exchange rates was plotted against growth rates of real exports for the 1962-91 
period, and the result is shown in figure 6.1. As can be seen from the figure, 
the two variables move together closely, with a correlation coefficient of 0.34. 
There are, of course, anomalous years in which the two variables moved in 
opposite directions, such as 1964, 1980, and 1985, and most notably 1975, 
perhaps as an aftermath to the first oil shock. But more conspicuous is the 
dismal export performance during 1989-91 with negative real growth rates, 
which was too bleak to ascribe to the appreciation in real exchange rates alone. 
This may be explained, however, by the dramatic increase in nominal wages, 
following the explosive labor disputes, experienced by the Korean economy 
since 1987. For instance, between 1987 and 1991, nominal wages in the manu- 
facturing sector more than doubled, while labor productivity rose only 28 per- 
cent. At the same time, the nominal exchange rate fell from 822.5 to 733.3 won 
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Fig. 6.1 Relation between real effective exchange rates for exports and growth 
rates of real exports 
per U.S. dollar in the same period. As a result, the unit labor cost in terms of 
U.S. dollars rose by 88 percent in the short span of 1987-91, which undoubt- 
edly undermined Korean exporters’ international competitiveness. These find- 
ings vividly illustrate the importance not only of exchange rate management 
but also of labor relations management in order to ensure that domestic export- 
ers can exploit export opportunities up to their potential. 
It has already been argued that Korea’s economic growth has largely de- 
pended on the rapid growth of exports under outward orientation. To show this 
more explicitly, figure 6.2 presents a regression line obtained by regressing 
growth rates of real GNP against growth rates of real exports, using the data 
set over the 1962-91 period. As expected, the result shows a strong positive 
relation between the two variables, with a correlation coefficient of 0.49 and a 
R2 value of 0.24 for the regression equation. 
This result is not special to Korea, however. Numerous empirical studies 
on the relation between the degree of openness, export growth, and economic 
performance have all produced evidence that there are important links between 
them.* Yet these studies provide little guidance as to the exact routes through 
which and the extent to which trade policies, or alternatively export expansion, 
might have affected overall economic growth. This is, perhaps, the reason any 
attempt to investigate causal links between them may be worthwhile. In the 
remainder of this section, the allocative efficiency of resources and the sources 
of economic growth will be briefly examined in relation to trade policies un- 
dertaken in Korea. 
8. See Edwards (1989) and Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1991) for a comprehensive survey of 
studies on the relation between openness and growth. 
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Fig. 6.2 Relation between growth rates of real exports and real GNP 
6.3.2 Trade Incentives and the Allocative Efficiency of Resources 
Trade reform is mostly undertaken to reduce distortions in the structure of 
relative prices and thereby to direct scarce resources to sectors that can make 
the best use of them. In that regard, trade reform has its primary impact on the 
allocative efficiency of resources, rather than on the rate of resource accumu- 
lation. 
In any trade reform, the most common course of action includes the simpli- 
fication of import procedures, the reduction or elimination of import quotas, 
and the rationalization of the tariff structure along with currency devaluations. 
However, the trade reform undertaken in Korea in the early 1960s indicates 
that the shift from inward to outward orientation was not achieved by liberaliz- 
ing imports outright with currency adjustments (a “free trade” route to outward 
orientation), but rather by introducing a strong set of export incentives to offset 
antiexport bias created by import barriers (a “subsidy” route to outward orien- 
tation). So until very recently Korea had a very complex system of trade incen- 
tives, in which export activities were not only allowed to operate under a 
free trade regime but were subsidized in addition, while import substitution 
activities remained under various forms of protection. 
It is apparent that the export subsidy route tends to be inferior to the free 
trade route for a number of reasons. Not only does the former involve substan- 
tial administrative costs, but export subsidies and import controls are rarely 
applied in an industry-neutral manner. Furthermore, QRs of any kind tend to 
generate large premia which will trigger rent seeking. Many able entrepreneurs 
may devote much of their energy and resources to privately profitable, but so- 
cially wasteful, rent seeking. 
There were a few reasons, however, why Korea chose the export subsidy 
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Table 6.5 Relative Incentive Rates on Exports and Domestic Sales in Korea, 1968 and 
1978 (%) 
Legal Tariff EPS for 
Rate NPR Domestic Sales ESR for 
Export Sales 
[ndustry 1968 1978 1968 1978 1968 1978 1978 
I. Agriculture 36.5 26.7 17.0 55.2 17.9 73.4 15.1 
[I. Mining and energy 12.5 6.3 8.9 -19.8 3.5 -23.8 10.6 
Primary production, total 35.1 24.2 16.5 45.8 17.1 58.7 14.5 
UI. Processed food 61.5 41.1 2.9 39.8 -14.2 -16.0 16.7 
N. Beverages and tobacco 140.7 133.2 2.2 20.2 -15.5 22.8 10.8 
V. Construction materials 32.2 29.5 3.9 -7.2 -8.8 -11.9 15.1 
VI-A. Intermediate products 1" 36.6 23.2 2.8 -2.4 -18.8 -27.4 17.1 
VI-B. Intermediate products IP 58.7 34.7 21.0 1.3 17.4 5.3 17.6 
VIlI. Consumer durables 98.3 44.3 38.5 40.2 39.8 81.0 23.1 
IX. Machinery 52.6 27.5 29.9 17.8 29.5 33.2 16.9 
X. Transport equipment 62.4 57.0 54.9 30.9 83.2 73.8 16.9 
Manufacturing, total 67.6 41.4 12.2 10.0 -1.1 3.7 15.8 
All industries 54.3 37.3 14.0 17.8 9.0 24.1 13.9 
VII. Nondurable consumer goods 92.3 49.3 11.7 14.9 -8.0 21.9 12.1 
~ ~~~ 
Source: Nam (1981b, 201, and 206). 
"Intermediate products I includes products in an earlier stage of fabrication than intermediate products II. 
route over the free trade route. First, rapid import liberalization was not feasi- 
ble, because of political pressure from groups with a vested interest in import 
protection. Second, the currency devaluation necessary to accompany the re- 
duction in import barriers was often feared as a source of inflationary pressure. 
Third, import taxes constituted a major source of government revenue. Finally, 
policymakers were guided by the erroneous belief that both exports and import 
substitution can be better promoted under the export subsidy than under the 
free trade route. 
It is not possible to quantify the precise impact of Korea's trade reforms on 
the allocative efficiency of resources, but it is possible to conjecture how re- 
source allocation might have been affected by those trade reforms by examin- 
ing the resulting structure of protection from the trade incentive system as a 
whole. If trade incentives affect prices of output or inputs, the best measure of 
incentives confronting domestic producers is effective protection rates (EPRs), 
but if trade incentives take the form of direct or indirect subsidies to a specific 
activity, the best measure of incentives is effective subsidy rates (ESRs). Both 
EPRs and ESRs measure the degree of protection or subsidy afforded to value- 
adding processes. These measures also provide an indication of the degree of 
efficiency gains in resource allocation attainable by the rationalization of the 
trade incentive system as a whole. 
Table 6.5 gives estimates of nominal protection rates (NPRs), which are 
based on price differentials between home and world markets, and EPRs for 
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domestic sales by industry group for 1978 in comparison with those estimated 
for 1968. Table 6.5 also provides estimates for ESRs granted to export sales in 
contrast to EPRs given to domestic sales, for 1978. A number of interesting 
features can be noted from the table, First, after a bold and significant liberal- 
ization effort in the mid-l960s, little progress seems to have been made in 
liberalizing import controls during the 1968-78 period. Most conspicuous is 
that protection for agriculture rose to a very high level, with a EPR of 73.4 
percent in 1978 compared to 17.9 percent in 1968. The strong protection of 
agriculture may have been intended partly to ensure security of food supplies 
but was instituted mainly to support farm incomes, and this was pursued 
through a high-rice-price policy introduced in the late 1960s. This high-rice- 
price policy persisted throughout the 1980s, making Korea more like Japan 
and EC countries than other developing countries, as far as protection of agri- 
culture is concerned. 
Second, the average protection rates on manufacturing remained relatively 
low compared to those in other developing countries during 1968-78 (see Ba- 
lassa 1971, 1982). The average NPRs declined slightly from 12.2 to 10.0 per- 
cent in the 1968-78 period for the manufacturing sector, whereas the average 
EPRs rose slightly from - 1.1 to 3.7 percent in the same period. The main 
feature, however, is not the low average value of NPRs or EPRs but their dis- 
persion across industries, resulting primarily from QRs. Furthermore, the dis- 
persion in EPRs was even wider in 1978 than in 1968, with some high positive 
rates and some negative rates, suggesting worsening resource allocation effects 
of the protection structure. The high protection for consumer durables, ma- 
chinery, and transport equipment and the negative protection for construction 
materials and intermediate products I are particularly noticeable. This is not 
too surprising since HCI products like electronics, heavy machines, and cars 
were actively promoted in the 1970s, while raw materials like cement, steel, 
and petroleum products were under complete price control at the time (see 
Nam 1981b). 
In view of Korea’s structure of protection, therefore, one may be tempted to 
conclude that Korea’s incentive system certainly failed to bring the same re- 
source allocation result as free trade would have achieved. Indeed, this is true, 
but the loss due to departures from the free trade result may not have been very 
significant, mainly because, as of 1978, Korea’s trade incentive system as a 
whole clearly maintained its bias toward exporting (as opposed to import sub- 
stitution) in most industries, with the notable exception of agric~lture.~ 
Korea’s export subsidy policy, however, had become increasingly difficult to 
9. Even in agriculture, despite high protection, employment changed very little for 1962-81, 
but declined rapidly at an annual rate of 4.3 percent for 1981-91. High protection for agriculture 
seems, therefore, to have had the side effect of slowing down the labor migration from rural to 
urban, or from farm to nonfarm, sectors of the economy, thereby reducing pressure from “too” 
rapid urbanization or urban unemployment, at least until the 1970s. 
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maintain by the early 1980s for a few reasons. One is that the export subsidies 
through preferential loans at below-market rates became increasingly burden- 
some to Korea’s monetary authority due to an ever-increasing export volume. 
Another is that subsidies by developing countries in general have increasingly 
become subject to countervailing duties by industrial countries, notably the 
United States.*O At the same time, Korea’s policymakers realized that the high 
protection given to HCI products in domestic markets did not guarantee their 
competitiveness in international markets. For these reasons, most export 
subsidy measures were removed in Korea by the early 1980s. At the same 
time, import liberalization was aggressively pursued throughout the 1980s 
so that the export subsidy route could be successfully replaced by a free 
trade route. Allocative efficiency of resources would have been improved ac- 
cordingly. 
6.3.3 
It has long been thought that outward-oriented trade reform has its positive 
impact on growth through a number of channels other than improved resource 
allocation-more in line with one’s comparative advantage. Among the most 
frequently cited channels are: the ability to exploit scale economies in produc- 
tion; easier access to better technologies, intermediate inputs, and capital 
goods; increased efforts toward labor training and research and development, 
to meet greater competition at home and abroad; and a better chance to have a 
general policy environment especially conducive to growth.” 
It has not been possible, however, to measure the absolute or relative impor- 
tance of these channels as contributing factors to growth. Not only is it difficult 
to single out the effect of trade policy among a myriad of other policy actions 
that could have a bearing on these channels, but growth itself can be affected 
by many factors other than those listed above. Thus, an attempt will be made 
below to examine the sources of growth estimated for Korea and to explore, 
though mostly at a conjectural level, their possible links to trade reforms under- 
taken in Korea. 
Table 6.6 provides estimates of the sources of growth, based on Denison’s 
(1967, 1979) approach to growth accounting, for Korea for three subperiods 
between 1963 and 1988. Table 6.6 also reports estimates of the sources of 
growth for Japan, West Germany, and the United States for comparison. A 
number of salient features can be identified from the table. 
First, more than half of Korea’s output growth is explained by increases in 
factor inputs-labor and capital-of which the contribution of labor has been 
persistently greater than that of capital in all three subperiods, accounting for 
Sources of Growth in an Outward-oriented Economy 
- 
10. E.g., Korea became one of the four developing countries that were most frequently count- 
11. For excellent reviews on this subject, see Krueger (1980, 1985), World Bank (1987). and 
ervailed against by the United States in the early 1980s. See Nam (1987, 193). 
Dornbusch (1992). 
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Table 6.6 Sources of Economic Growth in Korea, 1963-88 
Korea 
Items Japan West Germany United States 
1963-72 1972-82 1979-88 1953-71 1950-62 1948-73 
Real national income 8.2 8.1 8.0 8.8 6.3 3.8 
(growth rate, %) 
Total factor input 4.2 5.6 4.8 4.0 2.8 2.1 
Labor 3.1 3.5 2.9 1.9 1.4 1.4 
Capital 1.1 2.1 1.9 2.1 1.4 0.7 
Output per unit of 4.0 2.5 3.2 4.9 3.5 1.7 
Improved resource 0.6 0.7 0.6 1 .O I .o 0.3 
Economies of scale 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.9 1.6 0.3 
Advances in 1.9 0.3 1 .o 2.0 0.9 1.1 
input 
allocation 
knowledge and 
n.e.c.“ 
Sources: Kim and Park (1985, 61-62) for Korea (1963-72 and 1972-82); Hong (1991, 27) for Korea 
(1979-88); Denison and Chung (1976,42-43) for Japan and West Germany; Denison (1979, 104) for the 
United States. 
”n.e.c. denotes “not elsewhere classified.” 
more than 30 percent of Korea’s growth.I2 The high level of labor’s contribu- 
tion to growth should have been affected by the trade reforms undertaken in 
Korea in two major ways. One is that the rapid expansion of manufactured 
exports and the concurrent expansion of the service sector has become a major 
source of labor absorption in Korea ever since outward-oriented trade reform 
was undertaken in the early 1960s, reducing first the hidden and unemployed 
labor force in the rural sector and then the labor force employed by the agricul- 
tural sector itself (see table 6.7). The other is that exports became more labor 
intensive in production and in commodity composition in order to accommo- 
date the shift in comparative advantage with outward-oriented trade reform in 
the early 1960s. For instance, physical capital intensity declined for exports, 
while it increased for competitive import replacements for the 1960-66 period 
(see table 6.8). As a result, the physical capital intensity of competitive import 
replacements was higher than that of exports by 56 percent in 1966, a sharp 
increase from 18 percent in 1960. The differential remained roughly the same 
through 1985. This suggests that, if the rate of capital accumulation was the 
binding factor on employment, additional investment in the export sector 
would have created roughly 50 percent more employment than would the same 
additional investment in the import substitution sector. On balance, it seems 
12. These results contrast with the experiences of Japan and West Germany in that more than 
half of their growth is due to increases in total factor productivity and the contribution of capital 
is greater than or equal to that of labor. 
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Table 6.7 Employment Growth in Korea, 1962-91 
Employment (thousand persons) Average Annual Growth rate (%) 
Sector 1962 1971 1981 1991 1962-71 1971-81 1981-91 1962-91 
Agriculture 4,837 4,797 4,801 3,103 -0.1 0.0 -4.3 -1.5 
Manufacturing 667 1,413 2,983 5,005 8.7 7.8 5.3 7.2 
Services and 
social overhead 2,158 3,737 6,239 10,468 6.3 5.3 5.3 5.6 
Total 7,662 9,946 14,023 18,576 2.9 3.5 2.8 3.1 
Source: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook (Seoul, various years). 
Table 6.8 Factor Intensity in Korean Manufacturing, 1960-85 
Sector 
Capital-Labor ratio 
(thousand U.S. $ per worker)” 
1960 1966 1978 1985 
Exports (A) 3.3 2.7 6.5 11.8 
Competitive import 
(B)KA) 1.18 1.56 1.46 1.47 
replacements (B) 3.9 4.2 9.5 17.3 
Source: Hong (1989, 100). 
% terms of 1985 constant U.S. dollars. 
clear that the outward-oriented trade reforms undertaken in Korea contributed 
significantly to expanding employment opportunities in Korea. 
Second, another interesting point that can be observed from table 6.6 is that 
the contribution of capital accumulation to growth was especially low during 
the 1960s. Of course, this was largely due to a low level of domestic investment 
in that period. This low domestic investment would have been even lower, how- 
ever, had foreign savings not been available. As was already seen in table 6.3, 
gross domestic investment measured only 12.8 percent of GNP in 1962, of 
which more than 70 percent was financed by foreign borrowing. After then, 
domestic investment grew very rapidly, with rising domestic income and sav- 
ings, reaching 25.4 percent of GNP in 1971 and 39.4 percent in 1991. During 
the 1970s, however, about 20-30 percent of Korean domestic investment was 
still financed by foreign borrowing. To be sure, this large amount of foreign 
borrowing would not have been possible had export earnings not been growing 
quickly under the outward-oriented trade regime. 
Third, table 6.6 shows that slightly less than half of Korean output growth 
was due to growth of total factor productivity (output per unit of input). Three 
major sources for the growth of total factor productivity have been considered 
and estimated for their respective contributions to growth: they include im- 
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proved resource allocation, economies of scale, and advances in knowledge. 
According to Kim and Park (1985,58), the contribution of improved resource 
allocation came primarily from the shift of labor from low-productivity agri- 
culture to high-productivity nonagricultural sectors. The contribution of im- 
proved resource allocation to growth has been very steady over the three sub- 
periods between 1963 and 1988, accounting for about 0.7 percentage points of 
the output growth rate, or about 10 percent of total output growth. Needless to 
say, labor migration from agriculture to nonagricultural sectors was greatly 
promoted by the export-promoting trade policy and the concomitant rapid 
growth of labor-intensive manufactured exports in Korea. 
Fourth, according to the estimates shown in table 6.6, the contribution of 
economies of scale to growth has also been very significant and steady over 
the three subperiods, accounting for about 1.5 percentage points of output 
growth rate, or about 20 percent of total output growth. This figure appears to 
be, however, somewhat less than those experienced by Japan and West Ger- 
many during the postwar period. This may be partly due to the high protection 
given to some import substitution activities in Korea, though exports have been 
fully liberalized. But the high protection of domestic markets may not have 
been too inimical to reaping scale economies since protection was often pro- 
vided to those industries that risked a loss in their export markets. 
Finally, a third source of growth of total factor productivity, classified as 
“advances in knowledge” in table 6.6, represents a residual which is obtained 
by subtracting the effects of improved resource allocation and economies of 
scale from the growth rate of total factor productivity. According to Kim and 
Park (1985, 59), the contribution of this third source of growth comes mostly 
from improved production technique, distribution, and business organization 
that occurred in a particular period. The estimates of the contribution of this 
source of growth show that it has been erratic over the three subperiods be- 
tween 1963 and 1988. Its highest contribution was obtained during the early 
period of outward orientation 1963-72, with 1.9 percentage points of the out- 
put growth rate, explaining nearly a quarter of output growth in that period. 
But it fell to a low of 0.3 percentage points of the output growth rate, ex- 
plaining less than 5 percent of output growth during 1972-82. Of course, this 
period includes two oil shocks, and a crop failure in 1980, but the massive 
investment drive in the HCIs may have also contributed to the poor productivity 
growth obtained in that period. 
In conclusion, trade reforms undertaken in Korea for the past three decades 
have not only led to static efficiency gains in resource allocation but have also 
generated dynamic growth effects through a number of channels, though it is 
not possible to single out their effects in quantitative terms as a major factor 
in economic growth. 
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6.4 Concluding Remarks 
Several policy lessons can be drawn from this study of Korea’s trade and 
exchange rate policies and the role they have played in Korea’s growth over the 
1962-91 period. 
First, an outward-oriented growth strategy was successfully implemented in 
Korea by an export subsidy rather than a free trade route until the early 1980s. 
Despite somewhat chaotic government interventions both on the export and on 
the import substitution side, the net effects largely offset each other, resulting 
in a good deal less discrimination-or more neutrality-between import sub- 
stitution and export production than in many other developing countries. 
However, other developing countries thinking of emulating Korea’s experi- 
ence with the subsidy route to outward orientation need to be cautioned. For 
one thing, this route was feasible in Korea mainly because protection of the 
home market was relatively low to begin with, so that antiexport bias was eas- 
ily offset by export subsidies.13 For another, it is hard to avoid economic losses 
due to distortions in factor and in output markets under the export subsidy 
route. For example, export subsidies through policy loans at below-market in- 
terest rates retarded the financial sector, and the promotion of the HCIs by the 
government proved very costly in Korea. Also, the wide dispersion of EPRs 
across industries observed in Korea indicates that further improvement in the 
allocative efficiency of resources can be achieved. Furthermore, export subsid- 
ies combined with import barriers increasingly risk antidumping or counter- 
vailing actions by some industrial countries. For these reasons, Korea, too, has 
shifted from an export subsidy to a free trade route to outward orientation since 
the early 1980s. 
Second, establishing a neutral incentive system between exports and import 
substitution constitutes an important condition for an outward-oriented growth 
strategy, but this alone does not guarantee rapid export growth. Korea’s experi- 
ence vividly illustrates that it is vitally important to maintain competitive real 
exchange rates to secure sustained export growth. In Korea, the real exchange 
rate for exports (including export subsidies) has been kept very stable over the 
1962-91 period, with the exception of a few years between the late 1970s and 
the early 1980s. In the early 1960s, export subsidies played an important role 
in keeping the real exchange rate for exports stable, amounting to, for example, 
as much as 37 percent of the official exchange rate in 1963. But beginning with 
the 1964 devaluation of the won against the dollar by nearly 100 percent, the 
government placed increasing reliance on adjustments of nominal exchange 
rates and less on export subsidies to keep the real exchange rate for exports 
stable over time, and by 1982 the export subsidies were entirely removed. 
Third, a critical precondition for fast growth is a high level of domestic 
investment. In Korea, foreign borrowing played an important role in financing 
13. E.g., Iarge export subsidies did not suffice to offset the high protection of import substitution 
in countries like Brazil and Mexico. 
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domestic investment, especially in the early years of outward-oriented growth 
with very low rates of domestic savings. During the 1960s, for instance, nearly 
half of gross domestic investment was financed by foreign borrowing, and 
about a quarter of it was foreign funded in the 1970s, when domestic saving 
rates averaged more than 20 percent of GNP. The government can be largely 
credited for this. Not only was mobilizing foreign borrowing a major compo- 
nent of each of Korea’s successive Five-Year Economic Plans since 1962, but 
the government extended its repayment guarantees to loans by the private sec- 
tor to stimulate foreign borrowing. However, without the rapid growth of ex- 
port earnings, such a large inflow of foreign capital would not have been pos- 
sible. 
Finally, in order to translate outward-oriented trade reforms effectively into 
rapid growth of exports and income, it is imperative to have all essential infra- 
structure in place. Education, transportation, and communication, the mainte- 
nance of macroeconomic stability, and a well-defined legal system are, for ex- 
ample, some of the important services needed for efficient market processes. 
Although the Korean government fumbled in some areas, such as the promo- 
tion of the HCIs and the control of the financial sector, it was a relatively effi- 
cient provider of these essential services. The successive Five-Year Economic 
Plans were instrumental in delivering essential infrastructure in Korea. 
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COIllEleIlt Shang-Jin Wei 
Chong-Hyun Nam’s interesting paper has an ambitious objective. He reviews 
Korea’s four decades of trade and exchange rate policies, assesses their role in 
Korea’s rapid growth, and finally draws four lessons for other developing coun- 
tries. 
His policy review presents a comprehensive and interesting picture of the 
policy structure supporting Korea’s outward growth strategy. Some of his mate- 
rial is not readily available outside Korea. 
I also agree with most of the lessons he draws for other developing countries, 
such as his emphasis on the importance of maintaining a competitive exchange 
rate and investing in infrastructure. However, I would like to add some qualifi- 
cations to one of his lessons: Nam has expressed skepticism about the desir- 
Shang-Jin Wei is assistant professor of public policy at the John F. Kennedy School of Govern- 
ment, Harvard University, and faculty research fellow of the National Bureau of Economic Re- 
search. 
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ability and feasibility of other developing countries’ following Korea’s lead in 
an outward-oriented growth strategy via export subsidy. This conclusion does 
not follow very well from the body of his paper. Furthermore, the outward- 
oriented strategy via export subsidy is both feasible and, under certain circum- 
stances, desirable for other developing countries. 
That pursuing an outward-oriented strategy via export subsidy to achieve 
high growth is feasible can be seen from the recent example of Chinese growth. 
Moving away from a rigid version of import substitution, China has since 1980 
embarked on an impressive path of opening up to the outside world. Export 
subsidies, explicitly or implicitly, have been extensively used in order to spur 
export growth. Over the 1980s, the average annual growth rate of Chinese ex- 
ternal trade was above 15 percent, three times higher than the growth in world 
trade. In some sense, export subsidy may be the way for a large country to 
rapidly increase its exports in a short time, although the threat of foreign anti- 
dumping duties places some limit on export subsidy. 
As for desirability, one can certainly find an efficiency-based justification 
for export subsidy. For example, if one believes in the existence of positive 
externality from export activity to the rest of the economy, then one would 
favor policies that encourage exports. Of course, this does not imply that any 
kind of export subsidy is necessarily beneficial. If the nature of the externality 
is such that the larger the total exports the better for the economy, then one 
would want policies that do not discriminate among various export activities. 
An example of this policy is an artificially undervalued domestic currency. In 
Korea’s case, the government’s policy in the 1960s and early 1970s of re- 
warding firms based on their export volume is close to a nondiscriminatory 
one. Its drive to support the heavy and chemical industries during 1973-79 
involved subsidies skewed toward a particular industry and later proved to be 
a mistake. 
I would like to suggest that, even in the absence of positive spillover from 
export activity, there is often a political economy argument for export subsidy 
for countries that are trying to get out of an import substitution trap. That is, 
free trade may be politically unattainable, but export subsidy (together with 
preservation of some old import protection) is attainable. In fact, Korea’s case 
is illuminating on this point. As Nam points out in this paper, one important 
reason that Korea chose the export subsidy route over the free trade route was 
“political pressure from groups with a vested interest in import protection.” As 
Nam’s review of Korea’s policies indicates, various policies of import protec- 
tion took a long time (two decades) to phase out even though Korea is regarded 
as a highly outward-oriented economy. I would like to elaborate on Nam’s ob- 
servation in a way that may or may not suit his taste. 
Femandez and Rodrik (1991) have taught us how, if an economy is initially 
dominated by import protection, free trade, though it may be able to muster a 
majority’s support if ever implemented, can be rejected in a political process. 
Because no one knows for sure how costly it will be for her to switch jobs if 
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free trade is indeed implemented, the ex post gainers do not realize they are 
gainers ex ante. Hence, import protection may be politically preferred to free 
trade even though a majority may benefit from free trade. 
Suppose the costs of switching jobs are uneven among people in the pro- 
tected sectors but are known to everyone. Would export subsidy with some 
import protection be preferred to pure import protection? The answer is yes if 
there are enough people in the protected sector who have a relatively low cost 
of switching jobs. In this case, export subsidy operates like job-switchmg as- 
sistance or a job-training fee that will greatly relieve the reservations that the 
low switching cost people have about leaving the inefficient but protected in- 
dustries. Because they benefit as consumers in a less distorted economy and 
now need not worry about income loss, they will side with people in the effi- 
cient export industries to move away from pure import protection toward ex- 
port promotion. If the number of low switching cost people plus those origi- 
nally in the export industries is large enough, they can exert strong enough 
pressure to materialize a shift in the trade regime. Therefore, although free 
trade is difficult to attain directly, export promotion can nevertheless be prefer- 
able to the original import protection. A formalization of the above story can 
be found in Wei (1993). 
To summarize, export subsidy is still feasible and can be desirable by both 
efficiency and political economy arguments. 
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